INTRODUCTION 1
Palm oil production has doubled every ten years since the 1960s, surpassing soybean oil in 2 2007 to become the world's dominant vegetable oil (USDA 2011). With rapid production 3 increases have come economic windfalls and environmental devastation. Indonesia, as the 4 world's largest palm oil producing country, is at the forefront of these changes. Palm oil has 5 been Indonesia's largest agricultural export for the last decade and has employed, in 6 production and processing, some 2-3 million Indonesians, or about 2 % of Indonesia's labor 7
force (World Growth 2011; World Bank & IFC 2011) . Palm oil production also threatens 8
Indonesia's extensive tropical forests including the biodiversity, carbon sequestration, and 9 other ecosystem services that these forests provide (Carlson et al 2012; Wilcove, & Koh 10 2010) . Across Asia, oil palm producers have relied almost exclusively (92%) on area 11 expansion as opposed to intensification to meet demand (USDA 2011), a trend that puts 12 enormous pressure on natural landscapes. 13
14
The rate at which palm oil plantations will continue to spread in Indonesia and elsewhere is a 15 function of supply constraints: land and labor costs, yields, and other factors that affect both 16 the intensive and extensive margin of production. But the structure of demand is equally 17 important in determining palm oil's price and, consequently, the incentives facing producers. 18
This paper focuses on the evolution of cooking oil demand in Indonesia; however, cooking oil 19 trends in other major palm oil consuming countries, such as India and China, also shape the 20 global market. Lessons from Indonesia's experience can give insights into the drivers of palm 21 oil consumption growth in these other countries. Ultimately, future of palm oil expansion 22 patterns cannot be understood without a comprehensive analysis of the factors that determine 1 1 Figure 1. Population's contribution to higher Indonesian palm oil consumption.
2
The total shaded area represents Indonesia's increase in palm oil consumption between 1985 3 and 2010. Interior rectangles show the contribution of population growth (large light gray 4 rectangle); population growth * per capita consumption growth (dark gray rectangle) and per 5 capita consumption growth (small light gray rectangle). Data sources: (USDA 2011) (World 6
Bank 2010) 7 8
Income effects

9
An obvious explanation for a surge in per capita Indonesian palm oil consumption is income 10 growth: as incomes rise, Indonesians have more money to spend on food. Income elasticities 11 of consumption are particularly high when people start out poor because the poor spend a 12 larger fraction of their incomes on food (Timmer et al 1983) (USDA 2010) . In 1992, the 13 World Bank estimated Indonesian vegetable oil income elasticities within a range of 0.6 -0.8 1 (World Bank 1992 ). Indonesia's income elasticity of palm oil consumption for 2007, 2 estimated across six income classes using national household survey data, is 0.4 (Badan Pusat 3 Statistik (BPS) 2009). This coefficient suggests that Indonesia's income elasticity of 4 consumption for vegetable oils is falling over time, as expected. 1 5 6 Income growth explains less than a fifth, of Indonesia's higher per capita palm oil 7 consumption. Despite strong economic performance -Indonesian real incomes have more 8 than doubled in the past 25 years, from $476 per capita to $1124 (World Bank 2010) --9 explaining all of Indonesia's higher per capita palm oil consumption based on higher incomes 10 alone would require an improbable income elasticity of 4.2. A high, but more reasonable 11 income elasticity estimate of 0.8 still explains only 19% of Indonesia's observed increase in 12 per capita palm oil consumption for food (see table 1 ). An income elasticity of 0.4 applied 13 across Indonesia explains a jump in palm oil consumption of 1.7 kg per capita, or about 10% 14 of the observed per capita consumption growth. 15 1 By contrast, the income elasticity of demand for Indonesia's main staple, rice is approximately 0.1, and may soon be negative (Timmer et al 2010) .
b Indonesia's national socioeconomic survey 1
In the future, as Indonesian incomes continue to rise, palm oil consumption for food will level 2 off. Patterns of palm oil consumption by income class reveal some 'topping out' at the highest 3 income levels, particularly among rural consumers (Indonesian Palm Oil Board 2008) ; 4 however, an important caveat is that the Susenas surveys do not account for palm oil 5 consumed outside the home that is incorporated into prepared foods as part of the overall 6 palm oil consumption figures. Urban consumers show less evidence in the Susenas data of 7 reaching a maximum level of consumption. In 2007, the median rural consumer in Indonesia 8 used 0.14 L/week of cooking oil, 67% of the maximum rural value of 0.21. Thus, as incomes 9 grow, there is significant room for expansion towards this suggested ceiling. 10
Urbanization effects
11
Indonesia's urban population grew rapidly in the past quarter century, faster even than 12 China's. While China and India saw urban population growth rates of 6.3% per annum and 13 4. 4% per annum, respectively, between 1985 and 2010, Indonesia' Indonesians consumed significantly more cooking oil, on average, than rural Indonesians in 18 the same income bracket (p = 0.01). However, the mean difference was only 0.01 kg / capita / 19 week or 5% of average consumption 2 . In 2007, a similar survey reveals no significant 1 difference between rural and urban palm oil consumption, conditional on income. Thus, there 2 is some evidence for convergence in consumption patterns between rural and urban 3 consumers; however, since the Susenas surveys do not account for palm oil consumed outside 4 the home that is incorporated into prepared foods as part of the overall palm oil consumption 5 figures, the urban-rural difference in cooking oil consumption is likely larger than the data 6 suggest. Urbanization may contribute to diets that are heavier in cooking oil as workers and 7 their families substitute towards fast-food type fried meals 3 that they purchase on the street. 8 9 Whether the difference in palm oil consumption between urban and rural Indonesians is zero 10 or as large 20%, the direct impact of urbanization on palm oil consumption is small. 11
Assuming that urban Indonesians consume 20% more palm oil than rural Indonesians implies 12 that as urbanization jumped from 26% to 53% in Indonesia between 1985 and 2010, migration 13 accounted for only a 0.24 kg/capita consumption increase on average for the country 4 out of a 14 total increase of 18 kg / capita, holding incomes constant. This small effect is not the 'missing 15 factor' that explains Indonesia's extraordinary growth in palm oil consumption. Older estimates put the own-price elasticity of vegetable oil demand in Indonesia at -1.3 to -15 0.26, with poorer consumers and rural consumers responding the most to price changes 16 (Monteverde 1987 consumption during this period was less, but the price changes within Indonesia were also 10 more moderate due to government consumption subsidies and trade barriers. Domestic 11
Indonesian cooking oil's downward price trend explains between 2% and 8% of per capita 12 palm oil consumption growth during this period. 13
Substitution effects
14
The impact of cross-price effects (changes in the prices of substitute commodities) on 15
Indonesian palm oil consumption is difficult to ascertain, because national price statistics 16 report 'cooking oil' prices rather than prices for unique oils such as coconut oil or palm oil. 17
What is clear is that substitution has been the primary cause of higher per capita palm oil 18 consumption in Indonesia. Palm oil's ascendance in Indonesian diets, as illustrated in figure  19 2, is equally a story of coconut oil's decline: as coconut oil consumption has declined, palm 20 oil consumption has increased. In 1965, the vast majority (98%) of Indonesian cooking oil 21 came from coconut with only a tiny amount (2%) coming from palm oil. In 1985 over half 1 (54%) of cooking oil still came from coconut. Today, the situation is reversed: 94% of 2 cooking oil comes from palm oil, with only 3% coming from coconut. The change in forty 3 years has been dramatic. The solid line shows palm oil's share of the domestic cooking oil market growing, from 2% in 7 1965 to 94% in 2010. Coconut oil's share of total vegetable oil consumption declined from 8 98% to 3% over the same time period. Source: (USDA 2011) 9 10
The sizeable fraction of consumption growth that remains to be explained after accounting for 11 higher incomes, urbanization, and falling prices is explained by substitution between coconut 12 oil and palm oil. The impact of substitution on higher per capita palm oil consumption is 13 approximated by multiplying the change in palm oil's share of total vegetable oil consumption 1 by the current level of vegetable oil consumption. This calculation is the difference between 2 the current level of per capita palm oil consumption and the quantity that would be demanded 3 if Indonesians consumed palm oil and other vegetable oils in the same proportions as they did 4 historically. The shift towards palm oil, away from coconut oil, accounts for an impressive 5 70% of observed per capita palm oil consumption growth in Indonesia (see table 2) and more 6 than half of total demand growth. 7 Table 2 The conversion from coconut oil to palm oil in Indonesian diets -and in Indonesian 5 agricultural landscapes -can be explained by a set of political and economic factors 6 including: local production trends, international trading patterns, innovations in crude palm oil 7 (CPO) processing capacity, and a concerted national policy effort to change dietary 8 preferences and promote palm oil. This dietary conversion went hand in hand with changes in 9 who was farming cooking oil commodities and which types of land. 10
11
POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY: A TALE OF TWO PALMS
12
Cooking oil is one of Indonesia's nine 'essential' food commodities of which the government 13 obligates itself to ensure sufficient supplies. As a result, government policy controls 14 significant aspects of cooking oil production, marketing, and price formation in Indonesia. 15
Together, policy and market forces dramatically transformed Indonesia's cooking oil 16 landscape: from the late 1960's through the 1970's, Indonesia exported some palm oil and 17 was essentially self-sufficient in coconut oil, increasing its coconut oil production on par with 18 domestic consumption (see figure 3) . Indonesians began consuming palm oil in the late 19 1970's and early 1980's; eventually, palm oil displaced coconut oil demand. By the mid 20 1980s, Indonesia was exporting coconut oil into the world market. Meanwhile, palm oil 1 production grew exponentially in Indonesia, permanently surpassing coconut oil production in 2 1982. Five years later, in 1987, palm oil consumption permanently surpassed coconut oil 3 consumption. Figure 3 details the rise of palm oil production and consumption, relative to 4 coconut oil, over time. Table 3 summarizes this transition in terms of three distinct phases and 5 the different policies that were active during each phase. Several political and technological 6 developments were crucial in allowing palm oil to outcompete coconut oil as Indonesia's 7 staple cooking oil. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, Indonesia produced enough palm oil to meet about 80% of 6 its domestic cooking oil needs. Most of this production was exported in the form of crude 7 palm oil (CPO). The lack of palm oil processing or imports for domestic consumption during 8 this period is surprising in light of Indonesia's current appetite for palm oil and doubly 9 surprising in light of the high price that coconut oil, if exported, would have fetched on the 10 world market. 11
Part of the explanation for Indonesia's vegetable oil consumption patterns during this period 12 was the organization of Indonesia's copra processing industry. Coconut oil consumption can 13 take two forms: Fresh nuts can be processed using minimal technology on the farm to produce 1 klentik oil; or, copra (dried coconut meats) can be processed at an industrial facility. Klentik 2 production is less efficient but was expanded because copra-processing factories on the island 3 of Java enjoyed a monopsony that effectively depressed farm-gate coconut prices. 4
Approximately equal shares of coconut production went to direct local consumption (either as 5 fresh coconut or klentic oil) and to copra production with the share of copra production rising 6 over time (Gwyer, & Avontroodt 1974 ) (p.84, Table 5 ). The low prices offered by copra 7 processors discouraged farmers from selling downstream to export markets and encouraged 8 local processing and consumption. 9
Coconut production was distributed across Indonesia's outlying islands on small farms 10 averaging 1.5 Ha in size (Gwyer, & Avontroodt 1974) . These farms were minimally 11 productive: coconut production rose just enough to keep up with domestic consumption. 12
During Repelita 1 (1969 -1974 ), Indonesia's first economic development plan, Indonesia's 13 government, with assistance from international donors, underwent an unsuccessful effort to 14 boost coconut production (World Bank 1985) . The plan seems to have failed for several 15 reasons: coconut farmers were remote and hard to reach; new coconut trees that did make it 16 into the ground were often planted in unsuitable terrain; and the project had serious 17 management problems (World Bank 1985) . 18
Despite coconut farms' remoteness and their minimal productivity, coconut farming remained 19 attractive to farmers because it was flexible in the face of drought or price shocks. Unlike oil 20 palm fruit, coconuts can be consumed on-farm in response to low market prices. In addition, 21 coconut farmers often multicrop with estate crops such as cocoa, clove, and coffee that have 1 complementary labor (and sunlight) requirements, a diversification strategy that serves to 2 minimize risk. 3
Palm oil, meanwhile, grew on large government-owned plantations and was exported rather 4 than consumed domestically. Exported palm oil took the form of crude palm oil rather than 5 refined, edible oil. Indonesia had minimal refining capacity: In 1974 there were four 6 fractionation plants in Indonesia that could separate liquid palm olein (used for cooking oil) 7 from solid palm stearin, possibly two of which were in operation. One factory had a capacity 8 of 9,000 tons of crude palm oil per year. These processing plants faced both management and 9 economic problems that kept them from being successful. Of the small amount (28,000 tons) 10 of palm oil that did not go to export, 15,000 tons went to solid baking fats and margarine 11 while the remainder went to soap (Gwyer, & Avontroodt 1974) . In 1968, Indonesia's 12 government nationalized private estates in an attempt to capture a larger share of export 13 earnings. At the time, palm oil made up about 5% of total agricultural export earnings (Food 14 and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2011). 15
Indonesia's vegetable oil system -marginally productive coconut oil for domestic 16 consumption, crude palm oil for export -was destabilized in 1973. At this time, a domestic 17 drought, coupled with a global soybean shortage that sent international coconut prices 18 soaring, caused Indonesia's domestic cooking oil price to spike. In an archipelago with 19 porous borders, strict export controls were ineffective at keeping domestic prices low. High 20 domestic cooking oil prices increased the profitability of domestic palm oil fractionation. 21
Exporting coconut oil while consuming palm oil domestically generated greater foreign 1 exchange savings. 2
Struggling to fill the domestic consumption gap for cooking oil, keep prices low, and avoid 3 importing coconut oil from the Philippines, Indonesia's government looked to palm oil 4 production. Palm oil was a prominent component of Indonesia's second planning period 5 (Repelita II), from 1974 -1979, which focused on agricultural development, infrastructure, 6
and development in Indonesia's outlying islands. Thirty-five percent of the funds for this 7 development program came from foreign international sources, including the World Bank and 8 the Asian Development Bank. 9
Middle period, 1974 -1985
10
The period from 1974 to 1985 saw a transformation in Indonesian diets as palm oil gained 11 acceptance as cooking oil -a change from the early 1970s, when Indonesia's palm oil exports 12 had been un-refined and unsuitable for cooking (palm oil was used domestically for some 13 soap and a tiny amount of margarine / solid fat consumption). As price increases for coconut 14 oil made palm oil refining economically more attractive, taste became the salient barrier: 15 Indonesians were not accustomed to eating palm oil. Indonesia's plantation ministry 16 advocated locally grown palm oil as a substitute for coconut oil (Chaudhuri 1994) . 17
Simultaneously, aggressive production policies produced steady palm oil output growth on 18 new plantations, keeping prices low. A concerted ministry-sponsored palm oil marketing 19 effort, coupled with favorable economics, eventually succeeded, by the mid 1980s, in 20 bringing domestic palm oil consumption on par with coconut oil consumption while retaining 1 Indonesia's role as a significant palm oil exporter. 2
As domestic coconut oil demand grew in the 1970s, the government looked to palm oil as a 3 substitute in order to keep cooking oil prices low. Other vegetable oil candidates were not as 4 promising: palm kernel oil (PKO) shares more properties with coconut oil than palm oil does, 5 but PKO production quantities are smaller than those of palm oil and production costs are 6 higher. Peanut oil, which (unlike palm oil in the 1970s) already supplied a small amount of 7 cooking oil, had similar problems of scale. Rice-bran oil struggled not only with scale, but 8 also with rancidity and transportation challenges. 9
Palm oil, too, was not an easy consumption substitute for coconut oil. In order to achieve a 10 significant market share, palm oil had to overcome issues of taste, colour, fractionation, and 11 refining. At first, manufacturers blended palm oil with coconut oil or flavored the palm oil to 12 make it more palatable (Piggott et al 2010) . Palm oil had to be refined from red to pale 13 yellow and deodorized to make it less different from coconut oil. Fractionation was also 14 critical because without fractionation, palm oil's semi-solid nature could remind consumers of 15 pork fat -not an attractive quality in a predominantly Muslim society. Refining was a 16 relatively expensive process; nevertheless both private and state-owned factories received 17 new investments. By 1981, Indonesia had approximately 1 million tons of fractionation 18 capacity of which half was utilized (World Bank 1985) . Even after being refined and 19 deodorized, palm oil's yellow colour stood out. A government-funded marketing campaign 20 originated the name 'kencana', Javanese for 'golden,' to make palm oil seem more familiar 21 and appealing to consumers. In addition, palm-based cooking oil was marketed to industrial 1 krupuk (cassava chips) manufacturers who were more sensitive to price and less sensitive to 2 appearances. Palm oil's frying properties proved to be tremendous in this regard, and palm oil 3 came to be considered of higher quality than locally-distributed coconut oil. 4
By 1981, Indonesia's 1.1 million ton domestic cooking oil market comprised a combination of 5 palm oil (39%), coconut oil (50%) and palm kernel oil (PKO) (11%). Some analysts at the 6 time believed that coconut oil's market share could not decline further due to the high demand 7 for fresh coconuts and the high lauric acid content of coconut oil which, analysts believed, 8 was necessary for cooking (World Bank 1985) . In fact, the cross-elasticity between coconut 9 and palm oil appeared to stay high with increasing substitution, defying expectations. 10
Indonesia undertook large and sustained investments in tree crops during Repelita 3 (1979 -11 1984) , planting approximately 178 thousand new hectares of coconut and 121 thousand 12 hectares of new oil palm, again with World Bank assistance (World Bank 1985) . Overall 13 agricultural investment was large, sustained, dominated by foreign capital, and focused on 14 tree crops more than food crops (World Bank 1992) . 15
Palm oil production flourished during this period while coconut oil production stagnated. 16
Possibly, the absence of good cash-crop alternatives to oil palm kept smallholders producing 17 oil palm fruit, even at a relatively low farm gate price. In contrast, coconut producers had 18 cocoa, coffee, and the option of home consumption. Overall, the marginal production costs of 19 large palm oil estates were lower than the marginal production costs of smallholder coconut 20 farms. Indonesian palm oil production received a massive boost from the nucleus estate 1 scheme (NES) that began in 1977. NES had both a production objective -to boost output and 2 facilitate technological transfer -as well as the broader political-economic objectives of 3 developing land and settling transmigrants in Indonesia's outlying islands (Booth 1988) . 4
Plantations under this scheme tended to be large: although there was a ban on foreign land 5 ownership and a legal limit on land holdings by Indonesians, estates could obtain permission 6 to use land that they did not 'own' (World Bank 1985) . The scheme did promote some 7 smallholder development: Indonesia's first smallholder palm oil plantations were established 8 in 1978 under the NES; and, land titles for smallholders could be granted at the discretion of 9 the state-owned plantation company (PTP) (World Bank 1985) (p. 16). Still, by 1982 10 smallholders produced only 0.3 percent of total palm oil production (World Bank 1989) . In 11 terms of land, palm oil plantations were 2% smallholder-owned, 28% private, and 70% 12 government-owned (World Bank 1985) . 13
Coconut oil production did not benefit from a similar organizational transformation. Local 14 smallholders, who undertook only minimal new plantings, continued to dominate production, 15 accounting for 98 percent of planted area in 1982 (World Bank 1989) . Between 1980 and 16 1985, the average age of coconut trees increased and production remained stable. In contrast 17 to oil palm, there were few new farms and new transmigrant farmers. Coconut production saw 18 some benefit from higher yielding hybrid seeds starting in 1979 (Piggott et al 2010) , but 19 overall coconut production benefited less than oil palm from government support and 20 continued to operate at higher cost. 21
As a whole, palm oil exports nearly doubled through the late 1970s to four hundred thousand 1 tons before the government intervened in an effort to lower domestic prices and ensure 2 domestic availability of cooking oil, a key staple. Various types of export restraints were used 3 at different points in time, ranging from export taxes to export bans (World Bank 1985) . In 4 general during this period, processors received monthly allocations of crude palm oil to 5 purchase from producers, who were required to sell at a fixed price. Then, palm oil was 6 distributed through a system of exclusive (and profitable) distribution rights. Locally 7 powerful distribution monopolies with special privileges from the government further 8 established palm oil as the dominant cooking oil (Peter Timmer, personal communication) . 9
In 1978, the first year that the government regulated edible oil exports, 36% of total palm oil 10 production was explicitly allocated to the domestic market and the rest could be exported 11 (World Bank 1985) . The following year, in 1979, government policy allocated 60% of palm 12 oil production to domestic use at below market prices (Piggott et al 2010) . By 1981, 13 government requirements forced almost all palm oil onto the domestic market. Exports of 14 crude and refined palm oil remained restricted in 1983 to prevent price increases (Piggott et 15 al 2010) . In 1984, Indonesia suffered $369 million dollars in forgone export earnings due to 16 restrictions on palm oil exports (World Bank 1992). These export restrictions represented a 17 large implicit subsidy to domestic refiners at the expense of mostly state-owned plantations 18 and at the expense of smallholder farmers who produced the oil palm fruit. 19
Efforts to lower coconut oil prices depressed local production but failed to keep prices low for 20 consumers. In 1976, Bulog, the national logistics agency, imported copra and sold it at a loss 21 to decrease domestic prices (Piggott et al 2010) . A shortfall of this approach was that 1 coconut processors (the majority of whom, by volume, were located on Java) had substantial 2 market power. Copra sold for $140 at the farmgate price compared with a $298 copra 3 equivalent price for cooking oil (World Bank 1985) . Farm gate taxes on copra served to 4 further discourage coconut production. 5
Current period, 1985 -present
6
Between 1985 and 2010, palm oil came to dominate Indonesian vegetable oil production and 7 consumption. In recent years, government interventions in cooking oil markets have been 8
fewer, yet palm oil remains the chosen cooking oil for Indonesian consumers. 9
Tax structures in the late 1980s continued to favor domestic palm oil consumption. Palm oil 10 faced a 10% export tax in 1989 (Piggott et al 2010) , plus quotas that forced palm oil onto the 11 domestic market at below-export prices (Piggott et al 2010) . In July 1997, with palm oil 12 prices steady, the export tax rates were reduced, but the massive depreciation of the rupiah 13 against the U.S. dollar in late 1997 triggered explosive increases in the prices of cooking oil 14 and other basic commodities. In response, between November 1998 and March 1998, the 15 government tried and discarded several policies in quick succession: an informal quota; 16 selective export quotas; tariff rate quotas based on domestic sales; a three-month ban on palm 17 oil and olein; a broader temporary ban including crude palm oil, stearin and palm kernel oil; 18 and then an indefinite ban on CPO. These policies were variously plagued by smuggling, 19 reduced foreign exchanage earnings, inefficiencies, and allegations of unfairness. Export taxes 20 for coconut oil were introduced to thwart smugglers who were circumventing the palm oil 21 export ban by disguising palm oil as coconut oil (Marks et al 1998) . Finally, as part of an 1 agreement with the IMF, the government decided remove the export bans and to rely instead 2 on taxes not to exceed 20 percent. Initially, the ban was replaced by export taxes at high rates, 3 but these taxes were reduced over the course of the year, as the rupiah strengthened. Export 4 taxes for crude palm oil in May 2104 were 12%, with increasing pressure to lower tax rates to 5 incentivize value-added and to keep Indonesia's products globally competitive. 6
Indonesia's domestic processing capacity grew, although it remained highly concentrated. In 7
1989, a single conglomerate controlled 45% of the licensed capacity for fractionation and 8 refining (World Bank 1989) . Malaysia had subsidized palm oil refineries as part of its 9 industrial strategy, stunting Indonesia's domestic capabilities. Indonesia had only a small 10 handful of processing factories in 1974, even fewer of which were in operation. By 1981, 11 Indonesia's CPO processing capacity had grown to one million tons; by 1997 it was 2.4 12 million tons; and by 2006, processing capacity had risen to more than 29 million tons 8 13 (Gwyer, & Avontroodt 1974) (Indonesian Palm Oil Board 2008) (World Bank 1985) . 14 Despite unfavorable export policies during this period, palm oil production surged. The palm 15 oil plantings undertaken starting in 1984 as part of Repelita 4 were 'the most ambitious ever 16 attempted for these crops in the world ' (World Bank 1985) . At the end of the campaign, 17
Indonesia boasted 18% of world production of 5.5. million tons with a low-age distribution of 18 trees (World Bank 1992) . As the trees matured, yields increased. Including smallholders, 19 however, remained challenging. Private estates that replaced government PTPs in the 1 transmigration program had even less interest in smallholder welfare. Recent evidence 2 suggests that contract farming on nucleus-estate schemes is dominated by households with 3 greater asset endowments and is unlikely to benefit poor smallholders (Cahyadi 2013) . 4
The dramatic change in the composition of domestic vegetable oil production and 5 consumption that took hold in the 1980s persists today. Substitution towards palm oil has 6 even reached Indonesia's outlying islands where home-produced klentic oil used to be the 7 dominant oil. In the Ujung Padang area of South Sulawesi, palm oil's market share went from 8 zero in 1986 to 60% in 1996. In the 1970s, this area had approximately 20 factories making 9 coconut oil from fresh coconuts or copra; in 1996 there were only six factories, of which three 10 produced refined cooking oil and three produced crude coconut oil. Coconut cooking oil 11 factories on Indonesia's outlying islands, as on Java, struggled to improve quality and keep 12 prices competitive as the world prices for their raw materials (coconuts, copra, and crude 13 coconut oil) increased and as palm export taxes kept domestic palm oil prices low. 14
Future consumption growth
15
That so much of Indonesia's historical palm oil consumption growth has come from 16 substitution away from other oils suggests that Indonesia's future palm oil consumption will 17 grow more slowly. Over 90% of Indonesian vegetable oil 9 now comes from palm oil, leaving 18 very little coconut oil (or other oil) to be replaced in Indonesian diets. Going forward, any 19 increase in palm oil consumption will come from higher overall vegetable oil consumption, 20 9 Used for food rather than substitution. Substitution among vegetable oils accounted for half of Indonesia's 1 growth in palm oil consumption between 1985 and 2010. In the future, palm oil consumption 2 growth will therefore be less than half as large given (1) the lack of further substitution 3 possibilities and (2) declining consumption elasticities for vegetable oil (3) lower rates of 4 population and income growth. 5
As population growth slows, as income growth slows, and as the income elasticity of palm oil 6 consumption falls, overall vegetable oil consumption will grow more slowly. Lower 7 vegetable oil consumption growth implies lower palm oil consumption growth. Table 4  8 shows annualized rates of palm oil consumption growth between 1985 and 2010 along with 9 simulated growth rates between 2010 and 2035 under both a baseline and a high-growth 10 scenario. In the baseline model, Indonesian palm oil consumption, which grew 9.4% p.a., on 11 average, over the past twenty-five years, is likely to grow by 2.9% p.a. between 2010 and 12 2035. This estimate assumes constant prices, no urbanization effect, constant vegetable oil 13 shares (no further substitution towards palm oil), and population and income growth 14 predictions in line with USDA (2010) estimates. The high-growth model simulates higher 15 income growth (4.5% p.a.), higher population growth (1.07%), and falling real palm oil prices 16 (-2.0% p.a.). Under this scenario, palm oil consumption grows at 3.8 % p.a., a stronger 17 growth rate but still far from the 9.4% annual growth rate that Indonesia experienced between 18 1985 and 2010. 19 Even at slower rates of growth relative to the past 25 years, Indonesia's total palm oil 20 consumption in 2035 will be at least double that of 2010. Some of this increased consumption 21 will be met through yield increases, for example through replacing existing oil palm trees with 1 higher-yielding clones as plantations are replanted (typically every 25 years). Still, a doubling 2 of palm oil demand over 25 years suggests that pressure to convert currently forested land into 3 palm oil production will continue to be substantial throughout Indonesia. 4
At the global scale, cooking oil consumption patterns in China and India --vastly different 5 from Indonesia's trends -are critical to the palm oil industry. China had just 5% of its 6 cooking oil from palm oil in 1985 and today still has only one fifth of its cooking oil from 7 palm oil. India is the world's largest palm oil consuming country despite the fact that only 8 44% of its vegetable oil consumption is from palm. An increase in this share increase due to 9 changes in trade policy or other factors would substantially affect global palm oil demand. In 10 addition, non-food uses for palm oil have the potential to upend the current structure of oil 11 markets. The potential demand for palm-based biodiesel, at a favorable price, is practically 12 infinite: palm-based biofuels, in the case where diesel prices or government mandates provide 13 adequate production incentives, would lead to a different qualitative conclusion about the 14 future of palm oil demand. Palm oil has demonstrated its viability relative to coconut oil over 15 the past twenty-five years; in the next twenty-five years, will palm oil prove to be more viable 16 than crude oil? Whereas food consumption policies have been critical to palm oil markets in 17 the past, energy policies may define palm oil demand -and patterns of agricultural 18 development --in the future. 19
CONCLUSION 20
Indonesia's conversion from coconut oil to palm oil -in both diets and production emphasis -1 has had far reaching consequences. During the 1970s and 1980s, smallholders produced the 2 majority of coconuts whereas oil palm grew on large plantations with much higher yields per 3 hectare. The displacement of coconut oil by palm oil in Indonesian diets and in Indonesian 4 agricultural landscapes has boosted agricultural productivity. Indonesia is now the world's 5 largest palm oil producer with oil palm companies contributing approximately 3 dollars to 6
Indonesia's economy for every dollar of profit (Hunt 2010 ). Indonesia's ongoing challenge is 7 to balance economic growth and efficiency with agricultural policies that benefit smallholders 8 and the poor. As the palm oil industry grows and globalizes, other countries can learn from 9 Indonesia's experience how to harness the nutritional and economic benefits of this industry 10 while minimizing the social costs. 11 12 1 
